

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 USUN N 00488 190129Z
ACTION IO-13

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EA-07 SS-15 SP-02 INR-07 L-03 DHA-02
/050 W

-----190131 105051 /70

R 190033Z FEB 77
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2480

S E C R E T USUN 0488

STADIS////////////////////////////////////

NOFORN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, KN, KS, UN, US
SUBJECT: KOREA: A POLITICAL INITIATIVE

REF: PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW MEMORANDUM/NSC 13, JANUARY 26, 1977

1. SUMMARY: AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE UN MEMBERSHIP ALONG THE LINES OF THE TWO-GERMANIES PRECEDENT FOR BOTH KOREAS WOULD SEEM BOTH TIMELY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST IN REDUCING TENSIONS AND IN SEEKING MORE DURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. INsofar AS NON-USE OF FORCE IS CONCERNED, ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UN CHARTER WOULD PROVIDE A FULL AND AS BINDING A LEGAL INSTRUMENT AS THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. WITH THE NON-USE OF FORCE OBLIGATION OF THE CHARTER SUBSTITUTING FOR THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ DECIDED, DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND COULD PROCEED. THE CLIMATE IS FAVORABLE FOR THIS INITIATIVE AND THE EFFECTS SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL WHETHER OR NOT IT SUCCEEDS.
END SUMMARY.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USUN N 00488 190129Z

2. FUNDAMENTALLY, WE SHOULD REMAIN VITALLY INTERESTED IN REDUCING TENSIONS AND IN SEEKING MORE DURABLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA. WE SHOULD REMAIN WILLING TO CONSIDER NEW IDEAS IN APPROACHING THE PROBLEM. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT ANY PROPOSAL: (A) WHICH WOULD DENY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA THE ROLE OF A FULL PARTICIPANT IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PENINSULA'S

FUTURE. (THIS WOULD BE UNFAIR AND UNREALISTIC. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS 35 MILLION PEOPLE, MORE THAN TWO-THIRDS OF THE PENINSULA'S POPULATION; AND IT HAS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH 93 COUNTRIES.); OR, (B) WHICH WOULD TERMINATE THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND BEFORE THERE ARE NEW ARRANGEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS TO MAINTAIN OR EQUATE TO THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, WHICH IS NOW THE SOLE LEGAL INSTRUMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN PEACE. OUR CONCERN ABOUT UNCONDITIONAL DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND IN KOREA HAS BEEN UNDERScoreD BY STATEMENTS BY NORTH KOREA. FOR INSTANCE, NORTH KOREA'S VICE FOREIGN MINISTER SAID IN THE UNGA ON OCTOBER 21, 1975: "THE NATURAL RESULT IS THAT, IF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND IS DISSOLVED, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF WILL ALSO CEASE TO EXIST."

3. BEARING IN MIND DEVELOPMENTS INCLUDING ANTI-NORTH KOREAN BACKLASH FROM THE PANMUNJOM AX MURDERS, DIVISION AMONG THE NON-ALIGNED OVER THE KOREAN QUESTION, WITHDRAWAL OF THE PRO-NORTH KOREA DRAFT RESOLUTION IN FACE OF INCREASING OPPOSITION AND REDUCED SUPPORT JUST PRIOR TO THE 31ST UNGA, NORTH KOREAN SMUGGLING SCANDALS IN SCANDINAVIA, AND NORTH KOREA'S LARGE FOREIGN DEBTS, 1977 MAY PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR PROGRESS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. TAKING ALL OF THE FOREGOING INTO CONSIDERATION, AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE UN MEMBERSHIP ALONG THE LINES OF THE GERMAN PRECEDENT FOR BOTH KOREAS WOULD SEEM BOTH TIMELY AND FULLY CONSISTENT WITH OUR FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST. THE CLIMATE IS FAVORABLE AND EFFECTS SHOULD BE BENEFICIAL, WHETHER OR NOT IT SUCCEEDS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USUN N 00488 190129Z

4. INsofar AS NON-USE OF FORCE IS CONCERNED, ARTICLE 2, PARAGRAPH 4 OF THE UN CHARTER WOULD PROVIDE A FULL AND AS BINDING A LEGAL INSTRUMENT AS THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT COMMITTING THE PARTIES TO MAINTAIN THE PEACE. THUS WERE THE TWO KOREAS ACCEPTED INTO THE UN, THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATING A MODIFICATION OF, OR A SATISFACTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR, THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WOULD BE GREATLY REDUCED IF NOT ENTIRELY ELIMINATED, ALBEIT DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ AS WELL AS ITS POSSIBLE TEMPORARY POLICING WOULD NEED NEGOTIATION. WITH THE NON-USE OF FORCE OBLIGATION OF THE UN CHARTER SUBSTITUTING FOR THE PROHIBITIONS AGAINST FORCE IN THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF THE DMZ DECIDED, DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND COULD PROCEED. THIS DISSOLUTION WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN THE UN AND WOULD REMOVE THE PRINCIPAL FACTOR AROUND WHICH THERE HAS BEEN MUCH UNHELPFUL RIVALRY AND HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS. THERE WAS WIDESPREAD SATISFACTION IN NEW YORK WHEN DEBATE ON KOREA DID NOT MATERIALIZE AT THE 31ST UNGA.

5. DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND WOULD, HOWEVER, END THE VALIDITY OF PARAGRAPH 2 OF THE AGREED MINUTE SIGNED IN WASHINGTON ON AUGUST 12, 1955, WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE RETENTION OF REPUBLIC OF KOREA FORCES UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE UN COMMAND WHILE THAT COMMAND HAS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR OPERATIONAL CONTROL COULD, THEREFORE, BECOME A SUBJECT FOR ACTIVE NEGOTIATION WITH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA.

6. AN INITIATIVE TO ENCOURAGE ADMISSION OF THE TWO KOREAS WOULD BE BEST TIMED TO FOLLOW, IF POSSIBLE, RESOLUTION OF THE MIA AND THE RELATED VIETNAM ADMISSION QUESTIONS. PREDICTABLY THIS INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE FAVORABLE IMPACT ON A MAJORITY OF UN MEMBERS. EVEN WERE PANMUNJOM TO REJECT IT, IT SHOULD SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE PRO-ROK POSITION SHOULD THERE BE DEBATE ON KOREA DURING THE 32ND UNGA. IN THE MEAN-
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 USUN N 00488 190129Z

TIME, STEPS TOWARD US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN SOUTH KOREA COULD HELP ENCOURAGE A CLIMATE CONDUCTIVE TO NORTH KOREAN ACCEPTANCE OF UN MEMBERSHIP AND THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS WHICH UN MEMBERSHIP INVOLVES. FORCE REDUCTIONS TOO COULD GAIN FAVORABLE RESPONSE FROM MOST UN MEMBER STATES. AT THE SAME TIME, EFFORTS BY THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO PROMOTE ITS INTERNATIONAL TIES AND TO MODERATE ITS STRICT INTERNAL REGIME SHOULD BE STRONGLY ENCOURAGED BY THE UNITED STATES. ADDITIONALLY AND VERY IMPORTANTLY, A CREDIBLE DETERRENT TO NORTH KOREAN ADVENTURISM MUST BE RETAINED.

7. WE HAVE DRAWN SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN OUR TINY MILITARY PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA UNDER THE UN COMMAND AND OUR SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY PRESENCE THERE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE US-ROK MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY SIGNED IN WASHINGTON ON OCTOBER 1, 1953. OUR OPPONENTS HAVE SOUGHT TO OBSCURE MATTERS AND TO CHARACTERIZE OUR WHOLE MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ROK AS BEING THERE UNDER THE UN FLAG. ACCORDINGLY, SHOULD OUR FORCE LEVELS IN SOUTH KOREA BE REDUCED PRIOR TO AN AGREED DISSOLUTION OF THE UN COMMAND, IT SHOULD BE MADE ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT ELEMENTS BEING REMOVED ARE NOT FROM THE UN COMMAND WHICH CONTINUES PENDING ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS JUST AS BEFORE TO REPRESENT OUR SIDE OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT.

8. GIVEN NORTH KOREA'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES COULD BE IMPORTANT IN ENCOURAGING NORTH KOREAN FLEXIBILITY ON UN MEMBERSHIP. IN THIS CONTEXT, PROMOTION OF INCREASED ALLIED (INCLUDING U.S.) TRADE CONTACTS WITH NORTH KOREA WOULD SEEM WORTHY OF CAREFUL CONSIDERATION.

9. SINCE NORTH KOREA'S MAJOR ALLIES -- THE PRC, THE USSR,
AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE NON-ALIGNED -- COULD PROVE INSTRU-
MENTAL IN PERSUADING PANMUNJOM TO ACCEPT UN MEMBERSHIP, OUR
SIDE'S CONTACTS WITH SUCH COUNTRIES ON A MEMBERSHIP INITIATIVE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 USUN N 00488 190129Z

COULD WELL BE OF KEY IMPORTANCE. WESTERN EFFORTS IN THIS UN
MEMBERSHIP INITIATIVE COULD BE COORDINATED THROUGH THE NEW
YORK CORE GROUP STRUCTURE.
YOUNG

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEMBERSHIP, PEACE, TERRITORIAL UNIFICATION, UNGA RESOLUTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, PRM/NSC-13
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 19-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977USUNN00488
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P860126-2130, D770059-0467
Format: TEL
From: USUN NEW YORK
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770223/aaaaaurz.tel
Line Count: 185
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: a352f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION IO
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: NOFORN, STADIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NOFORN, STADIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3271977
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: KOREA:A POLITICAL INITIATIVE PRM/NSC-13
TAGS: PEPR, PFOR, KN, KS, US, UN
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/a352f2c3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009